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TRANSACTIONS

or THE NEBRASKA ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

THE NORMATIVE INCOMPLETENESS OF SOCIAL THEORIES
Werner Lcinfellner
Department of Philosophy
University of Nebraska

1. There are two main reasons to use a metalanguage, when we analyse a
given informal language (a) of science. The first reason is to avoid semantic
antinomies of the liar type. The concept of a metalanguage, widely used since
Tarski (1956: 152-268), proposed to split up the normal informal scientific
language (a) into an object language (b) and a metalanguage (c). Only within
the metalanguage (c) we can speak about the object language (b). Ordinary
informal languages are according to Tarski "closed languages." Closed
languages make no differences between semantic expressions such as "true,"
which refer to expressions of the object language. If, for example, we assume
the statement "all decision makers are liars" within the informal language (a)
then whatever a decision maker says, a contradiction will follow. If he says
the truth according to the earlier statement he lies and if he lies, then he says
the truth. Semantic expressions belong therefore in such a stratified language
system to the metalanguage, which contains two parts: the critical one by
Tarski called the semantical and the translational part in which the object
language or object theory is repeated solely by terms of the metalanguage.
Thus the first reason to introduce a metalanguage was given by the definition
of truth, or the truth of a statement or proposition S.
Similar difficulties arose within metamathematics, when Hilbert tried to
analyse the concept of provability. This second reason is more a syntactic
one, notwithstanding the fact that any semantic definition of truth demands
the definition of proofs. If a statement asserts its own unprovability, then it
follows, that this statement is provable if unprovable, and if unprovable then
it is provable. Since this holds for any richer formal system according to
Godel (1931: 176), we have to use a metalanguage, when 'provable' belon&,
to his metalanguage. The results of Tarski's and Hilbert's introduction of
metalanguages show clearly (i) that any analysis of especially scientific
languages which uses critical expressions has to use a metalanguage. Critical
expressions are linguistic expressions, which refer to other linguistic expressions, such as true, false, provable (ii) that the separation of the object theory
as well as its formalizatiGJ1 and axiomatization is from the beginning a highly
artificial procedure. The object language (b) can preserve only approximatively all the characteristic features of the informal theory (a), is therefore
not an exact mapping of the informal theory (a) into the object theory (b),
hence a more arbitrarily and artificially reconstructed object theory (b). This
is important to understand the difference between mathematical object
theories or between cognitive axiomatized object theories (b) and the actual
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informal theories (a) of mathematical textbooks or of informal cognitive
scientific theories (a). In most cases the analyst does not look back any longer
at thc informal theory (a) if he builds up his object theory (b). Therefore
philosophy of science cannot analyse the factual given form of science (a) but
rather a highly idealized, formalized and by axiomatization separated
paradigm. (iii) The most important result of any meta theoretical analysis of
sciellce, is, that according to Tarski's remarks, there are far more critical
expressions in our language, than true, provable (Leinfellner, 1973).
In fact all intensional expressions such as alethic, modal, deontic,
normative, belief-expressions can be defined only by means of stratified
language, which will be called epilanguage. An epilanguage is an extended
metalanguage. The metalanguage contained in the epilanguage analyses the
synt~ctic and pure semantic properties of an object theory; this can be
regarded as the first fundamental step of an analysis which has to be
complemented by cognitive or descriptive-semantic aspects of the object
theory (b) to approximate the real informal science (a) under consideration.
This can be achieved by adding the modal aspect in case of social theories
(mod~l complementation), by the realization-complement in the case of
technological theories, by the normative-aspect in the case of action, decision,
value-theories and by the deontic-aspect in the case of juridical, moraltheories of social sciences. Thus all the necessary aspects build up step by step
the so called "background knowledge" of a theory or science. (iv) It is clear
thal such an epilanguage is "beyond the unbridgeable gap between extensional and intensional logic (Quine, 1953: 157), since once the syntactic
and pure semantic features have been analysed in a first step, then in a next
step, independent of it the deontic analysis provides the "ought" aspect, seen
from the sole point of view of obligations how to use certain theorems,
axioms. Therefore, an epilanguage guarantees that the object language is
value free, whereas the epilanguage itself may contain certain binding norms
admitting evaluations of scientific sentences of the object language.
This and similar questions have been discussed recently in the author's
book (Leinfellner, 1973). Here a specific question is raised, which could be
called the normative incompleteness of theoretical especially social sciences.
Maybe the most important action theory, the statistical decision theory under
uncertainty and risk will be analysed epitheoretically and it will be shown
that a normal action theory of E-St type is incomplete from a normative
point of view and how it can be complemented by means of the epilanguage.
2.

Epitheoretical definition of the structure of a decision theory TD under risk and
uncertainty (statistical decision theory; see Chernoff-Moses (1959) and Menges
(1969)).
2.1. The structure (A,E;P,L,R,RR) is called the kernel of the statistical decision theory
under risk and uncertainty and at the same time the translation into the epitheory
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ETD if following conditions are fulfilled.
2.1.1. A is a Boolean field of sets forming with w, a probability measure P, a finite
additive probability space (A;P), where w E P.
2.1.2. E is a Boolean field of sets forming with Pe' a probability measure P, a finite
additive probability space (e,P), where Pc E P.
2.1.3. X is a Boolean field of sets forming with Px' a probability measure P, a finite
additive probability space (X,P), where Px E P.
2.1.4. A is a finite set, the elements of A, ai form n-tuples S, strategies.
2.1.5. L is a real valued function, 1efined on the set E and the set A L(ei,aj) where eit E
and ai E A, the values are the aij2.1.6. R is a real valued function, defined on the set S and the set E, where
R(ei'~)

and si

E

S'ej

E E,ai E

m

=.L L (ei,aj)'px.'

1-1
A, and i

I

=

1,2, ... n
r

j + 1,2, m. The values of the function R are the a ii
2.1.7. R R is a real valued function, obtained from the function R by multiplying each
value afj by the corresponding value P ei' Thus
l=m
R R(sj) = _L R(ei,Sj)Pei
:=1
2.1.8. The L,R-functions arc twice differentiable.
2.1.9. Dl:A strategy is admissible if there are no strategies which dominate it. A strategy s
dominates a strategy s* if R(ei s) ;? R(ei's*) and if it is not equivalent to any other:
R(ei's) =F R(ei's*).
2.1.10. There exists a minimum of the values of R, such that

*
m
R *(S) = min.(L R(ei,sj)Pei)
J
Fl
2.1.11. T2: There exists a minimum of the maxima:

min max (Pei,a1j)

This highly formal axiomatization can be regarded as the set-theoretical or
conceptual framework of our theory, it serves for defining the structure of a part D
of the world (Leinfellncr, 1965; Lcinfellner, 1967), defines the underlying logic
epitheorctically and the system of inference, either deductively or probabilistically.
2.2. Epitheoretical definitions of underlying logic and inferential system:
2.2.1. The underlying logic is a Bourbakian type set theory (Bourbaki, 1968).
2.2.2. The underlying inferential system is a mixed classical probabilistic one.
The axiomatization together with the theorems (or consequences in the probabilistic
case) have to be complemented by a cognitive or descriptive sematic interpretation.
Generally any interpretation (representation) is done by rules of representations.
Representation rules are composed of rules of interpretation or correspondence
plus designation-rules. Representation is divided into classical and statistical, botb
decompose into effective or possible ones. Use of possible designation yields tile
modal aspect of theories, i.e. such a theory refers to a possible, future world. For
more details see the authors publications (Leinfellner, 1973: 4.6; Leinfellner, 1968:
196-210; Leinfellner, 1964: 195-213, 238-278).
2.2.3. Example of an interpretation by means of possible C-rules. (the designation rules are
omitted here. " ... I - - -" should be read: " ... (belonging to the epitheoretical
kernel (L T ) is interpreted by --", (belonging to an epitheoretically defined empirical
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language L o )' contrary to the common opinion and following recent criticism
(Suppe, 1972: 1-20) each complementation creates its own empirical language,
therefore Lo has not the "absolute" character of Carnap-Hempel's observational
language. Following correspondence rules are important: A/possible actions of
decision maker; E/random events of the world; X/possible events of a chosen
sample; W/frequencies of possible events; pe/a-priori frequencies; px/frequency of
occurrence of x within the sample events; S/possible strategies of the decision
maker, series of actions; L/possible loss of the decision maker as consequence of the
actions ai;R/expected loss as consequences of arbitrarily chosen strategies Sj and of
the events ei; and finally Rr /the risk of L or the risk of the expected losses of the
sample.
Since this decision theory deals with possible alternative decisions, called the
conflict, out of which the decision maker has to choose the optimal, called the
solution of the conflict the modal-cognitive aspect has been presented elsewhere by
the author (Leinfellner, 1973).
2.2.4. The above interpreted theory belongs to the E-St type of behavioristic social
theories. Generally, there are S-R, E-St, St-St types of social theories. In the first
case interpretation uses the stimulus(S)-response (R) interpretation, in the second
case the random-event (E)-strategy interpretation and in the third case the strategy
(So-·strategy (St) interpretation. What we may observe in our case is therefore, given
a random event (e), the decision maker may react by a strategy (St).

3. The normative complementation.
Normally a decision theory, as outlined in chapter 2 is regarded to be
complete. But if we apply such a theory we have to add "oughts" i.e.
obligations for the decision maker f.e. he has to minimize his losses etc. This
we want to do epitheoretically. Such an epitheoretical complementation can
be regarded not only as a normative complementation, but as a moral
foundation of decision making. A short comparison of physics and social
sciences will illustrate why we should use epitheoretical obligations within
social sciences.
The fundamental empirical situation in classical physicS is, that f.e.
motion of rigid bodies can always be predicted in a classical deterministic
sense, since the empirical course of motion is a constant one and the only
variables are location and impulse. Exact deterministic prediction is possible
because of the constant kinematic "behavior" of rigid bodies under
consideration. The cognitive aspect of such a theory is a mere predictive one.
The situation changes completely if human beings and their acts St as well as
chance events E from which their acts are dependent are the basis D of a
theory of the type E-St. Beside the random events E we have random factors
such as the unforseeable random generator of human decision makers called
free will and the organic wholistic character of social systems which introduce
a fundamental instability, inconstancy and unrepeatability in D of a social
theory of E-St type. That is exactly the empirical or on tic situation, which
has to get under control by the moral commitment. Thus we have to
introduce a stability and constancy via our deontic or moral commitments.
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There is another reason for it. All physical classical as well as all cognitive
sciences are strict cognitive in the sense that they gain knowledge of
constantly occurring processes, which are endless repeatable given the same
conditions, but social sciences together with all technological sciences possess
a different aspect, they are creative realizing sciences. A decision theory
creates norms and standards of future rational and moral decision behavior
just in the same sense as we create technical aretefacts by our technology.
Thus realization of a future societal order by a social theory is completely
different from recognizing an outbalanced and in the same manner constantly
occurring classical physical process. Only from outside of science Le. by
epitheoretically moral commitments (3.1-3.4) we may impose stability and
constancy on future human behavior, thus introducing a new dimension of
responsibility for social scientists.
3.1. Minimal normative complement. The decision maker has to obey by a binding
predecision following neoutilitarian obligations, if he wants to justify his decision
making.
3.2. Every person partaking in a (public) evaluation or decision procedure is obliged to
use during the decision procedure a well formulated (epitheoretically expressed
decision framework (f.e. the theory ETD) consisting at least of rules how to use and
apply it (Rational insight commitment)
3.3. Each person participating in a (public) evaluation-procedure has to accommodate
its evaluation (scale) to the evaluation (scale) of the rest, that means has to establish
an interpersonal utility comparison, in form at least of an ordinal scale.
(Interpersonal utility committment)
3.4. Each person partaking in a (public) evaluation or decision procedure has at the
same time to maximize its utility and expectations and to be prepared for any
possible compromise admitted by the rules of the decision procedure between best
and worst expectations (compromise or minimax commitment i.e. Pareto optimality-demand) .

These commitments 3.1-3.4 belong to the epitheory, they enable us to
formulate decision rules or better advice from the point of view of the
theory TD, whieh are free of the objections and paradoxes usually attributed
to them. It makes no difference what decision rules we want to use Le. Bayes'
solution to minimize the expected losses (see theorem 2.1.10) or Wald's
solution to minimax it. (th. 2.1.11) We may express all these decision rules by
using deontic operators put before the corresponding theorems. f.e. The
decision maker is obliged to act according to theorem 2.1.9. By using the
epitheoretical commitments following results can be achieved and following
problems be solved (i) the problem of rationality, widely discussed in game,
decision and action theory which can not be solved by axiomatization alone
(Harsanyi, 1955: 321; Waldner, 1972: 87-103). (ii) The application of utility,
game:;. decision-and action-theory to solve social decision procedures (iv) ,
Arrows impossibility theorem (Schwartz, 1970: 89-106) does not affect our'
theory, the theory presented here is Arrow-immune, (v) Allais paradox can 1>0'
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resolved wit!. lIt this normatively complemented system (Booth, 1974). (vi)
Any epithcu, :tically based decision theory can be considered as a moral
fO\lndJtinll of social sciences. Thus we have shown that the introduction of
an epilal1,\uage (-theory) is an ideal mean to complete scientific theories, to
add to T',t'. an extensional metatheoretical aspect an intensional deontic,
withoU1 ",etting into the well known difficulties (Quine, 1953: 157).
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